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Foreword 
CalMac is a national treasure, connecting island communities to the mainland and ensuring their 
social and economic health, as well as preserving maritime skills at a time of decline. Yet Scotland’s 
national ferry operator is under attack, from Serco again.  
It is a plain fact that these lifeline services could not be provided without significant public subsidy, 
whether that’s on the larger Clyde and Hebrides network or on the Northern Isles routes that were 
privatised in 2012 when the Scottish Government awarded Serco the six year contract. 
It is also a fact that companies like Serco are attracted to these contracts by the large amounts of 
taxpayer subsidy required to run them and the low risk nature of these contracts, as no Government 
can see ferry services to the Scottish islands fail.  
Serco’s finances are complex and subject to commercial confidentiality but we know that since 2012, 
before the share price went through the floor, £145m was paid out by Serco to private shareholders. 
What we also know is that CalMac has returned over £10 million to the Scottish taxpayer on the 
Clyde and Hebrides (CHFS) network since 2008. 
Privatisation would undoubtedly result in CalMac workers, passengers, communities and businesses 
paying for Serco’s business model of service and jobs cuts to maximise profit. Furthermore, millions 
have been invested by CalMac and the Scottish Government on infrastructure, vessels, services and 
fares over the current contract, with a £36m (40%) increase in CHFS expenditure in the last two 
years. More investment is guaranteed to 2022 under the Ferries Plan, predominantly on new vessels 
and infrastructure work on CHFS services. This huge level of public investment should not go to prop 
up the ailing fortunes of Serco but should continue to refine and improve the public sector 
operation, CalMac. 
The decision on the £1 billion CHFS contract is of vital importance to the future economic and social 
well-being of CalMac workers and the communities they serve and invariably live in. The Scottish 
Government’s decision to announce the winning bid only weeks after the Holyrood elections risks 
disenfranchising those communities. If more time had been taken to discuss the specifications of the 
contract in 2013, as originally committed by the Scottish Government in 2012, then voters would be 
casting their votes on 5th May knowing whether CalMac had won the contract or if the entire 
Scottish ferry network had been privatised by the Scottish Government. 
As author of two previous reports into the economics of tendering lifeline ferry services, Jeanette 
Findlay is an authoritative and highly respected commentator on this issue. RMT welcomes 
Jeanette’s latest report as an important intervention, ahead of the Scottish Parliament election 
campaign.  
We hope all candidates and voters will support the case for keeping CalMac public. 
 
Mick Cash 
General Secretary, RMT 
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Executive Summary 
 
1. The current report was commissioned by the RMT in the context of the CHFS 
tendering process which was announced in February 2015 and for which the 
invitation to tender was issued in July 2015. 
 
2. It seeks to examine the relative merits of the private and public sector bidders in this 
process both in relation to the fulfilment of the contract itself but also in relation to 
other elements which have an economic value to the island economies and to the 
Scottish economy. 
 
3. It does so in the context of the Ferries Plan 2013-22 in which the then Minister 
outlined the Government’s commitment to ferry services which are ‘first class and 
sustainable, stimulate economic growth throughout Scotland, enable rural and 
remote communities to thrive, continue to make a significant contribution to 
Scotland's economy’ and which aim to ‘maximise the economic and social potential 
of our remote rural and island communities.’ 
 
4. The Ferries Plan signalled significant public investment in vessels, harbours and 
infrastructure much of which has already taken place. 
 
5. The report notes that the dangers identified in the competitive tendering process 
since 2005 still pertain.  The theoretical problems of moral hazard and the Principal-
Agent problems are shown to have been justified in the history of ferry tendering in 
Scotland and remain a consideration in the current process. 
 
6. CalMac Ferries Ltd has operated in an efficient, innovative and strategic way in the 
conduct of the CHFS contract and has shared with the Scottish Government all the 
benefits of cost savings. 
 
7. Serco Group the owner of Serco Northlink has an extremely troubled history in 
relation to its public sector contracts;  it has no significant experience in the 
maritime industry and its financial health and business model raise concerns in 
relation to any unforeseen aspect of the current contract as it proceeds. 
 
8. The operation of the Northern Isles Ferry Service (a service considerably smaller and 
less complex than CHFS) by Serco Northlink, while not without incident, especially in 
the early period, has been of good standard.  
 
9. The evidence presented here indicates that the public sector operator CalMac has 
employment policies and values which are fully in line with Scottish Government 
thinking in these matters and with the direction in which the Government wishes the 
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Scottish labour market to change and which contribute to its planned Future Islands 
policy.  It has the potential to be a leader in the sector and for the economy as a 
whole in delivering fair work, good quality work, training and innovation as well as a 
good quality service to the consumer/public.  Indeed, to a considerable degree, it 
already is leading in these areas.   
 
10. There is much less evidence that Serco Caledonian could or would wish to play that 
role and its motivation and focus in winning the CHFS tender is naturally based on its 
status as a profit-seeking entity. The experience of Serco Northlink as described 
above, and the activities of Serco in other markets, suggests that the overall labour 
market strategy of the Serco group of companies is not pointing in the same 
direction as that of the Scottish Government in a number of key respects. 
 
11. The economic value of a public sector provider to the fragile island economies and to 
the Scottish economy remains enhanced relative to that of the private sector 
provider examined here and, possibly, relative to that of any private sector operator. 
 
12. The estimated costs of tendering remain very high in the context of very limited 
scope for cost savings in the operation of the tender. 
 
13. The perverse outcome that if CalMac were to lose the CHFS tender then competition 
well into the future would be destroyed remains a very significant risk and a striking 
example of an unintended consequence of the tendering process. 
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1 Background and Motivation  
This report is the third report2 3into the competitive tendering of lifeline ferry services in the Clyde 
and Hebrides which the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and/or the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) have commissioned over the past decade.  The current report 
was commissioned by the RMT in the context of the CHFS tendering process which was announced 
in February 2015 and for which the invitation to tender was issued in July 20154.  The decision will be 
announced at the end of May 2016, will take effect in October 2016 and will run for a period of up to 
eight years 5.   
The Scottish Government originally intended to begin the process in 2012 with the new contract 
taking effect in October 2013. Following concerns raised by RMT, STUC and the other CalMac unions 
(Nautilus, TSSA and Unite) over the Northern Isles Ferry Service (NIFS) contract and a lack of 
information over employment and pension protections in the CHFS contract, the then Transport 
Minister Keith Brown announced that the new contract would be postponed until October 2016, 
with the tender process starting in ‘autumn 2014.’  The existing contract with CalMac was extended 
for three years ie to 30th September 2016. 
The remit of the report is to set out the background to this tender; to consider the attributes of the 
bidders in terms of their direct experience of running ferry services in Scotland and any other 
relevant experience; and to assess the extent to which the bidders might, in running the CHFS, 
contribute to other policy objectives set out by the current administration.  Finally, the report will 
comment briefly on the costs associated with the competitive tendering process and consider the 
longer term impact of the possible outcomes. 
Two participants have been selected by Transport Scotland to submit bids in this process.  They are 
CalMac Ferries Ltd, the incumbent provider, and Serco Caledonian Ferries Limited. 
                                                          
2 Findlay, J, (2005) The Financing of Lifeline Ferry Services to the Clyde and Hebrides: a report commissioned by 
the STUC 
3 Findlay, J (2010) The Provision of Lifeline Ferry Services: Delivery and Tendering. A report commissioned by 
the STUC to inform their response to the Ferries Review by the Scottish Government 
4 The methodology used here is largely desk-based, and involving use of secondary data, but a number of 
interviews were conducted with RMT national officials and with Martin Dorchester, the Managing Director of 
CalMac and Chief Executive of David MacBrayne Ltd.  Interviews took place with a small number of seafarer 
employees of Serco Northlink.  An interview with senior management at Serco Northlink and Serco Caledonian 
Ferries was requested but due to the commercial sensitivities surround the current bid this did not take place. 
5 Clyde and Hebrides Ferry Services Contract for Provision of Ferry Services and  Harbour Operating Agreement 
http://www.transport.gov.scot/ferries/clyde-and-hebrides 
 6 
 
 CalMac Ferries Ltd6 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of David MacBrayne Ltd, which is wholly owned by 
Scottish Ministers and is the public sector bidder for this contract. 
 
Serco Caledonian Ferries Limited was incorporated in March 2015 and is owned by Serco Group plc 
an international services provider which operates in thirteen separate and diverse markets grouped 
into five headings:  Justice & Immigration, Defence, Transport, Citizen Services and Healthcare.  
Serco Northlink Ferries, also owned by Serco Group plc, has held the £243m contract for the 
provision of the Northlink Ferry service to Orkney and Shetland (Northern Isles services) since May 
2012 and this contract is due to run till 2018. 
Scottish Ferries Plan 
The background to the plans for the provision of ferry services in Scotland is contained in the 
Scottish Ferries Plan7 which was launched by Keith Brown, the then Transport Minister, in December 
2012.  The Plan contains his commitment, on behalf of the Scottish Government, to providing ferry 
services which: 
 are first class and sustainable 
 stimulate economic growth throughout Scotland 
 enable rural and remote communities to thrive 
 continue to make a significant contribution to Scotland's economy 
 
The introduction to the plan states that the aim, among other things, is to  
‘maximise the economic and social potential of our remote rural and island communities.’ 
The Plan outlines the future of Scottish Ferry services with respect to a number of important 
dimensions such as investment, procurement, harbour charges, routes, services, fares and future 
tenders (including the CHFS tender currently underway).   
The Plan envisaged considerable increases in investment in ferries in excess of £300m over the 
period till 2022 in vessels, ports and infrastructure, much of it in relation to the Clyde and Hebrides 
                                                          
6 The vessels and piers are owned by Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd (CMAL) which is also wholly owned by 
the Scottish Ministers.  Both CalMac and CMAL were created in 2006 in order to take part in the first tender 
for the Clyde & Hebrides Ferry Service contract. CMAL leases the vessels and ports to whoever operates the 
service which, at the time of writing, has always been CalMac. 
7Scottish Ferry Services: Ferries Plan (2013-2022) ISBN 978 1 908181 71 8 
http://www.transport.gov.scot/report/j254579-00.htm 
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routes.   The actual spend in recent years was given in an answer to a written question to the 
Minister on 29th October 20158, who provided the following table: 
 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
   (forecast) 
Clyde & Hebrides Ferry Services £85,522,390 £101,071,419 £115,958,000 
RET £3,889,000 £5,034,000 £10,000,000 
    
Sub-total (CHFS Network) £89,411,390 £106,105,419 £125,958,000 
    
Northern Isles Ferry Services £37,507,196 £35,973,572 £32,268,314 
    
Other Ferry Services £4,299,504 £3,288,197 £3,545,281 
    
Total (Ferry Services) £131,218,090 £145,367,188 £161,771,595 
    
Piers & Harbours and Vessels £13,295,693 £20,216,321 £45,495,000 
    
TOTAL £144,513,783 £165,583,509 £207,266,595 
 
It is clear from this that substantial public investment is going into both ferry services which will 
benefit whichever providers win the CHFS contract in 2016 and the NIFS contract in 2018. 
Paragraph 30 and 31 of the Ferries Plan, sets out the Scottish Government’s view on competitive 
tendering of ferry contracts and the role of private sector companies: 
The benefits of regulated competition, in the right circumstances, were seen in the outcome 
of the recent tendering of the Northern Isles Ferry Services contract. Four bids were 
submitted – more than for any previous Government ferry contract in Scotland – and the 
successful bidder, Serco Ltd, has entered into a contract offering a continued and enhanced 
quality of service at a very competitive cost to the Scottish Government. 
                                                          
8 Written Question from David Stewart MSP S4W- 27940 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28877.aspx?SearchType=Advance&MSPId=3806&S
earchFor=AllQuestions&DateChoice=3&SortBy=DateSubmitted&MAQA_Search_gvResultsChangePage=9 
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We are aiming for a similarly competitive exercise – and similar financial benefits - for the 
Clyde and Hebrides Ferry Services contract that will commence in 2016.... 
The report offers no evidence to support the statement that there has been an ‘enhanced quality of 
service’ and as we shall see later, there are significant areas in which private sector provision and 
other objectives of the ferries plan are not well matched.  The consideration of these other 
objectives is fully compliant with European law9. 
In short, the Ferries Plan expresses the Scottish Government’s overall vision for lifeline Ferry services 
between the island communities and the mainland as well as their detailed objectives on almost an 
island by island basis. 
 
Report Outline 
Many of the issues raised with respect to the impact of tendering lifeline services in general, and 
ferry services in particular, are set out in detail in Findlay (2005 and 2010) referred to earlier (and 
from which we quote below in italics).  We will not rehearse all of them in detail here but many of 
them remain substantively the same today.  These are:  
 the issues of moral hazard (in relation to the management of vessels in which the operator 
has no long term interest) and the completion of the contract on the original terms in the 
absence of a competitor: 
Moral hazard
 
(another consequence of imperfect information) also arises in this present 
context in so far as costly assets may be left in the hands of agents who have incentive to 
maintain them only for a fixed period far short of their reasonable life expectancy. (2005) 
 
 the principal-agent problem inherent in writing time-consistent and enforceable contracts in 
the context of imperfect information regarding the costs and compliance of operators;  
Principal-Agent problems refer to the class of economic problems in which an Agent (in this 
case the winner of the tender) acts for a Principal (in this case the Scottish Executive). This is 
usually in circumstances of asymmetric information where the asymmetry is such that the 
Agent knows more about its costs and its compliance with the contract than the Principal. 
This leads to the need for (often costly) monitoring and careful consideration and design of 
the contract in order to reduce costs and to try to make the contract self- enforcing, where 
possible.(2005) 
 
                                                          
9 Directive 2014/ 24, Articles 37 and 90   
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.094.01.0065.01.ENG  
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 the argument that public sector operators have no disincentive to provide safety standards 
and employment conditions which are greater than the minimum while private sector 
operators do 
The estimates are based on data for all ferry operators (with estimates being used 
for Western Ferries and Pentland Ferries) therefore differences in the pay rates and 
the employment levels are hidden within industry averages. However, it is known 
that both pay rates and crewing/employment levels are higher in the public sector 
companies and therefore those companies have a greater impact on the 
communities which they serve. 
 Employment in the ferry sector clearly provides a higher level 
of income to employees than the average income for all the 
areas in which they are located - see Table 2.5 of the HIE 
report. This is taken to also reflect the higher number of full-
time, permanent posts than in the labour market generally in 
Scotland. 
 The income impacts are only the direct impacts (ie the wages 
and salaries received). There will also be second-round impacts 
ie when ferry crews spend on local goods and services this 
supports employment outside the ferry industry. These second 
round impacts are likely to be large because most of the 
spending activities of ferry employees (particularly in the island 
communities) will be carried out in their own communities and 
won't 'leak' out to other areas thereby diminishing the local 
employment effect. In these circumstances, the direct impacts 
of ferry sector employment are likely to be a significant 
underestimate of the total impact of ferry sector employment. 
(2010) 
 
 the additional social and economic benefits which a public sector operator can/does provide 
which are unlikely to be provided by a private sector bidder;  
Cal-Mac’s mission statement sets out its ethos as a public service provider. In 
addition to setting up a Disability Steering Group, consulting with CMUC on a 
regular basis and continuing to promote the Gaelic language, Cal-Mac makes a 
valuable contribution to the artistic and cultural life of the Highlands. Activities 
such as supporting the Royal National Mod, organising the ‘Ceilidh to Craignure’ 
and hosting art exhibitions on board its vessels, resulted in the company winning 
the Arts & Business Brand Identity Award along with the organisers of the Mod, An 
Comunn Gaidhealach, and being nominated for a VisitScotland Scottish Thistle 
Award for excellence in Scottish tourism. These activities have a value which goes 
beyond the day to day running of the ferry service and Cal-Mac’s proactive 
approach to them would, in all likelihood, be a loss to the wider community. (2005) 
 
 and the issue of Operator of Last Resort 
There is another, potentially more serious issue which relates to the concept of the 
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Operator of Last Resort.  Professor Neil Kay has written extensively over a long 
period on this very matter and it is, to date, still unresolved. The need for an 
Operator of Last Resort exists whether or not there is a public or private 
operator of a service but it is undoubtedly more crucial in the latter case, both 
in the tendering process (where unsuitable operators would be likely to apply  
in the knowledge that the absence of an OLR will give it the upper hand in 
future negotiations with the SG) and in the carrying out of the contract itself 
(where the issue of moral hazard arises both with regard to the maintenance of 
the vessels
 
and, more crucially, in terms of the completion of the contract on 
the original terms). Specifically, the incumbent would have an incentive to 
simply seek to renegotiate the contract in its favour, in the knowledge that the 
SG would have no alternative but to comply. There is an even greater risk of 
this if a failure to win the contract were to lead, as it most probably would, to 
the demise of CalMac. In the status quo case, while there would still be a need 
for an OLR, CalMac and North link operate in the context of a completely 
different set of structural relations to the SG and face a different set of 
incentives to that of a private company. This, in and of itself, would make the 
chance of these outcomes being realised far less likely. (2010) 
 
In the next section the Clyde and Hebrides Ferry service (CHFS) is outlined together with the 
distinctive features of public sector provision on those routes.  In Section 3 we look at the 
performance and attributes of the private sector competitor in this process, Serco Group plc, and 
more particularly, for the purpose of comparison, at its Serco Northlink arm which currently holds 
the Northern Isles contract.  In Section 4 we look at how the decision over the award of the CHFS 
contract relates to another important strand of Government policy, namely the Fair Work agenda. 
In Section 5 we consider again the costs and risks of the tendering process and our conclusions are 
set out in Section 6. 
2 Clyde and Hebrides Ferry Service: CalMac Ferries Ltd  
The CHFS was first put out to tender in 2006 following a long-running debate over whether this was 
necessary to comply with EU rules on State Aid and EU Maritime Cabotage Regulation 3577/92.  The 
bundle of routes (twenty-six in total) which make up the service are not profitable and require 
subsidy to be paid to the operator10. Under European competition regulation, in order for subsidy 
not to be defined as State Aid and therefore to be lawful, certain conditions11 must apply.  That 
debate, while not resolved in fact, is resolved in practice since the then Scottish Executive (now 
Government) took the view that competitive tendering was necessary for the subsidy to be lawful.  
                                                          
10 The level of subsidy expected to be paid for the CHFS contract were provided by the Transport Minister in a 
written answer to Elaine Smith MSP on 3/6/15 and were indicated to be between £110m and £120m for each 
year of the 2016-2024 contract. 
11 The Altmark Judgement, 2003 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html downloaded 13/2/16 
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Notwithstanding recent legal opinion which appears to confirm that competitive tendering is not 
necessary on the basis of the Teckel Exemption12, the current tender will proceed.  The Scottish 
Government and the RMT have agreed to make a joint application to the European Commission on 
this matter and, depending on the outcome of that application, this may alter the landscape for the 
future. 
 
The service was previously run by the publicly-owned Caledonian MacBrayne Ltd but in preparation 
for the tender the operating side was separated from the vessel-owning side.  The operating side 
became CalMac Ferries Ltd and the vessel-owning company became Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd 
(CMAL) which was set up to hold ownership of the vessels and piers and lease them to the winning 
bidder. The contract was won by CalMac Ferries Ltd and they have operated the route since that 
time13.   
 
In 2013-14, the last year for which figures are available14 CalMac operated 133,477 scheduled 
sailings over 26 routes; carried over 4.5 million passengers (4.9 million if you include Argyll Ferries 
Ltd which operates the Gourock-Dunoon route); and carried just under 1.2 million cars, commercial 
vehicles and buses and 3000 tonnes of loose freight.  CalMac charters a fleet of 33 vessels from 
CMAL and is responsible for their maintenance during the contract. 
 
In response to a written question from John Finnie MSP on 3rd March 201415 the Transport Minister 
provided the maintenance schedules/standards of CalMac and Serco Northlink and they are 
reproduced here: 
Under the requirements for surveys by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the 
Classification Society (Lloyds Register) each ship must be surveyed every year for renewal of 
their Passenger Ship Safety Certificate.  
The 3 vessels operating on the Northern Isles Ferry Service undergo dry docking every second 
year with in water surveys being carried out every alternate year. These vessels were, or are 
planned to be, in dry dock between January 2014 and March 2014.  
All the vessels operating on the Clyde and Hebrides network have been, or will be, dry docked 
during winter 2013-2014. The vessels which operate on the Clyde and Hebrides Ferry Service 
Network and are dry docked very year. 
                                                          
12 http://www.rmt.org.uk/news/scottish-government-does-not-need-to-tender-ferry-service/ downloaded 
13/2/16 
13 The original contract was from 2007 t0 2013 but was extended by the Scottish Government to 2016. 
14 The figures for 2014-15 are due to be released on 29/2/16 
15 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/BusinessBulletin/73320.aspx  
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All machinery on the vessels including the engines is maintained to the manufacturer’s 
instructions and satisfaction of the MCA and Lloyds Register. 
 
Albeit that the vessels used by Serco Northlink are not leased from CMAL, the response would 
appear to indicate that the concerns quoted above in relation to moral hazard are well-founded.  
The level of maintenance is clearly less rigorous than that applied by CalMac.  
 
In any of the debates around competitive tendering there has never been any serious suggestion 
that the CHFS has been badly or inefficiently run.  Indeed there is evidence of performance targets 
for reliability and punctuality being met to a considerable degree.  In the Directors’ Report for 2014-
15 it is noted that technical reliability was 99.93% and punctuality was 99.75% (a slight drop on the 
previous year which they attribute to increases in the severity and frequency of extreme weather 
events).16   The Directors’ Report also contains evidence of high performance in the award of the 
Best Ferry Company in the UK Transport Awards for 2015 and the Best Ferry Company in the 
Guardian/Observer Travel Awards for the fifth year in a row.  The Head Office operation won the 
‘best performing large business in Inverclyde’ award from the local Chamber of Commerce. In the 
same year, CalMac achieved ‘Global Standard Accreditation for the helpfulness and professionalism 
of its customer operations staff.17’  This does not mean that there are no areas in which the current 
operations could not be improved but efficiencies are being made on continuous basis: to illustrate, 
in 2015 CalMac returned £1.98m of subsidy to Transport Scotland (£1.92m in 2014 and £10.35m in 
total since 2007-818) as a result of efficiencies made during the year.  The sharing of efficiency 
savings with the taxpayer is not part of the Northern Isles contract and Serco Northlink have made 
no such payments to the Scottish Government.  However, the subsidy clawback mechanism has 
been built into the current CHFS contract.  This is an example of how contracts must be specified in 
considerably more detail in order to force private sector operators to behave in ways that public 
sector operators do as a matter of course.  Bearing in mind that contracts are six to eight years long 
and may become longer, there can be very long periods where there are practices in place which are 
not beneficial to the interests of the public.   
 
                                                          
16 CalMac Ferries Ltd  Directors’ Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 March 2015 
file:///C:/Users/jf4z/Downloads/CalMac_Ferries_Limited_Directors'_Report___Financial_Statements_201415.
pdf downloaded 13/2/16 
17 https://www.calmac.co.uk/press/calmac-secures-global-recognition-customer-service-standards 
downloaded 13/2/16 
18 CalMac Annual Report and Accounts, various  
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Major areas of customer dissatisfaction appear to be being dealt with eg customer dissatisfaction 
some years ago (cf Findlay, 2005) was centred to some extent around the ticketing arrangements 
and the performance of Head Office in Gourock.  Major investment in an online ticketing system has 
taken place and, in addition, free Wi-Fi is being provided on board its ships.19  CalMac has spent in 
excess of £23m on IT since the beginning of the contract in 2006-7 with over £8m being spent since 
2012 largely on IT, Wi-Fi and smart ticketing20.  The accolade awarded to the Head Office by Gourock 
Chamber of Commerce suggest that previous areas of customer dissatisfaction have also been 
overcome. 
 
There is evidence, some very recent, that the operation of CalMac brings wider benefits to the local 
economy, the local labour market and to island tourism.   The Fraser of Allander Institute at the 
University of Strathclyde has produced an economic impact report for CalMac Ferries Ltd21 which 
estimated that the onward effect of CalMac’s turnover of £145m created turnover for other Scottish 
firms of £270m.  We shall return to this report in Section 4 when we consider CalMac’s role in the 
delivery of the Scottish Government’s Fair Work agenda. 
 
As noted earlier, substantial sums (in excess of £10m) have been returned to the Scottish 
Government over the period of the contract as their share of the cost reductions achieved by 
CalMac.  David MacBrayne Ltd, in an innovative move for a publicly-owned company, has (jointly 
with GBA, a global logistics company) secured a thirty-five year contract to operate one of the 
biggest naval bases in the UK, Marchwood Military Port in Southampton22.  This, according to Martin 
Dorchester23, Managing Director of CalMac Ferries Ltd and Chief Executive of DML, opens up 
opportunities for increasing revenues well into the future which should go some way towards 
minimising the subsidy required by CalMac to run the CHFS.  It is possible therefore that we shall see 
a continuation and possible expansion of the subsidy clawback. 
                                                          
19 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/business/14031629.David_MacBrayne_posts_loss_after_investing_in_ticketi
ng_system/ downloaded 13/2/16 
20 Written Question by David Stewart 27/3/15  
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20150327.pdf 
21 https://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/feeds/news.aspx?id=612 downloaded 13/2/16 
22  In November 2015 David MacBrayne, the parent company of CalMac, announced that it has won a 35 year 
MoD contract to run a military port in England in a joint venture with another company. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-34725144 downloaded 12/2/16.  DML was also 
involved in unsuccessful bids to run ferry services in Gotland, Sweden and the Woolwich Ferry in 2014. 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13158639.CalMac_bid_to_run_European_ferries/ downloaded 
12/2/16.  
 
23 Telephone interview, Friday 12/2/16 
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In summary, therefore, it can be argued that CalMac Ferries Ltd has operated in an efficient, 
innovative and strategic way in the conduct of the CHFS contract and has shared with the Scottish 
Government all the benefits of cost savings. 
 
3. Northern Isles Ferry Service:  Serco Group plc and Serco Northlink Ferries 
Serco Group plc 
As a company the Serco Group has experienced some difficult times in recent years and been subject 
to considerable criticism in the way that it has managed its public sector contracts.  Examples of 
failures in its UK public sector contracts include the fact that it over-charged on its contract with the 
UK Ministry of Justice to operate its electronic tagging scheme and in 2013 had to pay back £68.5m 
to the government24.  As a result of this it suffered, in the words of the company Strategic Report, 
‘Immense reputational damage’25.  It was barred for bidding for government contracts for a period 
and is still under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in relation the tagging contract.  It has 
acknowledged a number of catastrophic errors in its health service contracts resulting in £17m of 
losses for the company and ultimately it decided to withdraw from all clinical health contracts26; it 
faced serious allegations in terms of it operation of the Yarl’s Wood immigration centre after an 
inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, as a result of which a number of staff were 
sacked27.  It does, however, continue to operate the facility and other prison facilities in the UK. 
More seriously and more pertinent to the current contract, Serco Woolwich Ferries were found 
guilty of ‘failing to ensure the health and safety’ of the crew of the Ernest Bevan over an incident 
which led to the death of teenage deckhand Ben Woollacott 28.  They were fined £200,000 as a 
result.  As noted earlier, Serco lost the Woolwich Ferry contract in 2012.   
As a consequence of these failings and the resulting fall in profits there was an overhaul of senior 
management of the company in February 2014.  In a Trading Update in 2015, the company reported 
that it is pulling out of a number of areas of operation due to their inability to make profits on them: 
                                                          
24 http://www.professionaloutsourcingmagazine.net/news/serco-pays-back-685-million-while-g4s-faces-fresh-
sfo-probes downloaded 14/2/16 
25 https://www.serco.com/Images/22000_Serco_AR14_tcm3-46422.pdf downloaded 14/2/16 
26 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f6816830-63e2-11e3-b70d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz409hxQVpz downloaded 
14/2/16 
27 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-24719300  downloaded 13/2/16  
28 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-34601388  
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We are making progress executing our strategy; total costs in the period were some £200m 
lower; we are reshaping the portfolio to become a focused provider of public services, and 
making good headway exiting loss-making contracts.29  
The share price of Serco Group plc has collapsed dramatically over a lengthy period as Chart 1 
shows. 
Chart 1:  Serco Group plc share price  
 
Data source: Interactive Data 
Graph source: Hargreaves Lansdown plc 
 
As the time of writing, despite the significant fall in share prices (to a level well below the level at the 
time of the £550m rights issue in July 2015), there appears to be no marked increase in demand for 
Serco Group shares which suggests that the markets do not have confidence that the price will not 
fall further.   
Other recent news also suggests that their troubles are not yet over.  Serco’s new Chief Executive, 
Rupert Soames, announced in December 2015 that profits for 2016 would be significantly lower 
(halved) than they had expected30. 
Despite what appears to be some success by Soames in dealing with systemic failures of the 
company, a process he rather colourfully described as 
we walked up the Serco high street saying, “bring out your dead”, and rather a lot of bodies 
came flying out of the windows31 
                                                          
29 Rupert Soames, Chief Executive, Serco Group, December 2015 https://www.serco.com/investors 
downloaded 14/2/16 
30 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e25d2a0c-9cbf-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861.html downloaded 15/2/16 
31 http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/article-2829246/Darkest-hour-Serco-chief-Rupert-Soames-depth-
crisis-embattled-outsourcing-giant-laid-bare.html downloaded 15/2/16 
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there remains some considerable doubt about the stability of this company, its willingness to pull 
out of contracts on which it fails to achieve its desired return and the suitability of its business model 
for handling essential/lifeline services.     
Serco is explicit in its admission that it enters contracts with no previous industry knowledge and 
relies on acquiring that knowledge in situ from the existing management/workforce.  In the words of 
outgoing Chairman, Alastair Lyons in his statement in the 2014 Annual Accounts32 
Typically, Serco inherited much of the technical capability for the diverse activities covered 
under our contracts, such as helicopter flight simulation or North Sea ferry operations, when 
it took over the contract. 
Serco Group’s only other experience of maritime transport, prior to it acquiring the North Sea Ferry 
Service contract was in running the Woolwich Ferry (a contract which it lost in 2012) and a contract 
to transport nuclear waste. 
Notwithstanding this, it has undoubtedly acquired that knowledge to some extent in the running of 
the Northern Isles Ferry Service and we return to that in the next section.  The advantage which 
Serco Group plc claims to bring to public sector contracts is the  
  drive, energy and innovation of the private sector33 
 
This, even to the extent which it accurately reflects reality , must be balanced against the increased 
cost of monitoring private sector entities due to the fact that they have an entirely different set of 
structural incentives to that of a public sector entity.  The necessity for this is well-founded in 
economic theory and the necessity to monitor the activities of Serco are well-founded in the 
empirical evidence in relation to that company’s history of mismanagement of a number of public 
sector contracts.   
The outcome of any contract, but particularly long-term contracts of the type under discussion, rests 
to a considerable degree on the way that the risk is distributed between the parties34.   The concerns 
expressed by Rupert Soames regarding the increased skill of government departments in negotiating 
such contracts35 confirms this but is also an acknowledgement that the most important  ‘game’ here 
                                                          
32 https://www.serco.com/Images/22000_Serco_AR14_tcm3-46422.pdf downloaded 11/2/16 
33 ‘Our Business Model’, Serco Group plc, Annual Report and Accounts,  2014 ibid 
34 Walters, Jackie, and Jan Owen Jansson. "Risk and reward in public transportation contracting." 
Research in Transportation Economics 22.1 (2008): 26-30; White, Peter, and Stephen Tough. 
"Alternative tendering systems and deregulation in Britain." Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy (1995): 275-289. 
35 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/serco-shares-plunge-after-the-outsourcer-which-runs-
everything-from-prisons-to-boris-bikes-issues-9850449.html downloaded 15/2/16 
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is not between the two bidders but between the government and the private sector bidder.  To the 
extent that the private sector bidder ‘wins’, the government, and therefore the taxpayer, ‘loses’.   
This, of course, holds for any competitive tendering process and it can be argued that there is 
potential for the overall benefits to outweigh any potential risk.  Furthermore, it is within the gift of 
the relevant public authority to take action to minimise financial risk by full and proper specification 
of the contract.  However, such risk can never be removed – it has to be held by one party or the 
other as Mr Soames clearly indicates. Moreover, in the provision of lifeline services of the kind under 
consideration here, the risk on the side of the public is not confined to financial risk but to 
innumerable risks up to, and including, risk to life. 
For the current purpose we can attempt to draw some inferences regarding the potential benefit of 
Serco Caledonian Ferries winning the CHFS ie in terms of the level of ‘drive, energy and innovation’ 
which could be brought to it,  by examining the operation of Serco Northlink in its conduct of the 
Northern Isles Ferry Service. 
Serco Northlink 
Serco Northlink won the tender to provide essential ferry services in the Northern Isles in 2012.   The 
contract was won following a period of difficulty with this contract involving additional payments to 
the service operator in 2003 and legal challenges to the tender process in 201236 37.  The current 
contract is due to end in 2018.   
In 2013-14, Serco Northlink Ferries Ltd operated 2886 scheduled sailings over 5 routes; carried 
283,000 passengers and 56,000 cars.  The data on commercial vehicles for the Northern Isles is no 
longer collected but no reason is given by Transport Scotland for this discrepancy between the data 
published for the two contracts. 
The performance of this contract, in terms of the provision of services to the travelling public and to 
business users, appears to have been reasonably successful.  It should be noted however that the 
number of sailings on the Scrabster to Stromness route have been reduced since Serco Northlink 
took over the contract and some concern was expressed by interviewees during the course of this 
research about Serco’s plans for this route.   The published figures for 2013-14 show 
reliability/punctuality figures combined38 for the Aberdeen routes and the Pentland Firth route of 
99.8% and 92.1% respectively.   The relatively low figure for the latter can presumably be explained 
                                                          
36 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2010/06/17134612/7 downloaded 14/2/16 
37 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-18251727 downloaded 14/2/16 
38 These figures are presented separately for the CHFS and there are no notes to explain this difference or 
what the combined figures mean 
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by the breakdown of the Hamnavoe referred to below.  Serco Northlink has not published more 
recent figures as CalMac has done but they will become publicly available by the end of this month 
(see footnote 14).   
The Chairman of the Shetland Council Transport Committee and of ZetTrans, the regional transport 
body, Cllr Michael Stout, indicated in a telephone interview with the author39 that ‘overall Serco’s 
performance is pretty good’ and that they were ‘good at responding to complaints’.  He also 
indicated that he believed they had a degree of transparency in their dealings with the community 
which he felt was an improvement on that of previous operators of the service.  There appears to be 
some dissatisfaction with service levels and capacity at certain peak times throughout the year 
(albeit this is disputed by MD Stuart Garrett40 ) but these were not attributed to any fault on the part 
of Serco Northlink by Mr Stout.  Indeed there appears to have been some effort by Serco Northlink 
to deal with this issue and to try to expand capacity with the use of ‘sleeper pods’.  This has been 
met with varying degrees of satisfaction.   The company received heavy criticism early on in the 
contract when the Hamnavoe, the vessel on the Scrabster to Stromness route, broke down and was 
out of service for a period of weeks.41 They were perhaps saved from more serious local reaction by 
the provision of additional passenger services by the private operator Pentland Ferries which 
operates an adjacent ferry service on the Pentland Firth. 
As mentioned above, Serco Northlink’s dry docking maintenance schedule for vessels is less frequent 
than that conducted by CalMac on CHFS vessels and that is a concern for the future both of this 
service and for intended practice should Serco win the CHFS contract. 
In summary therefore, it appears that the operation of the Northern Isles Ferry Service by Serco 
Northlink, while not without incident, especially in the early period, has been of good standard and 
indeed, there appears to be a degree of satisfaction of island communities with the willingness of 
senior management to respond to difficulties reported to them. It should be noted however, that the 
lack of recent figures (which should be rectified by the time of publication of this report), the 
combined nature of the reliability/punctuality figures and the lack of data for commercial freight 
make a direct comparison with the performance of CalMac less than straightforward.  The latter 
issue is particularly relevant in that the interview data with Northlink employees contains a 
                                                          
39 The telephone interview took place on Friday 12/2/16 
40 http://www.shetlandtimes.co.uk/2015/06/12/figures-disprove-ferry-capacity-claims downloaded 14/2/16 
41 http://www.johnogroat-journal.co.uk/News/Serco-faces-fresh-criticism-over-lack-of-a-plan-B-09052013.htm 
downloaded 14/2/16 
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suggestion that at busy times freight is given more priority than passengers on the Northern Isles 
routes.   
Crucially for the current purpose it is not straightforward to conclude that good performance on the 
North sea routes will necessarily transfer over to the Clyde and Hebrides routes given the huge 
disparity in the size and complexity of the two sets of services and the limited other experience which 
Serco has.  
4 Scottish Government objectives:  Fair work  
In October 2014 the then First Minister, Alex Salmond announced at an STUC conference that a Fair 
Work Convention would be established by the Scottish Government42.  The working definition of fair 
work that the Convention uses is 
Fair Work is work that provides opportunity, fulfilment, security, respect and effective voice. Fair 
work balances the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees and can generate 
benefits for individuals, organisations and for society.43 
The key themes that the Convention is considering are opportunity, fulfilment, security, respect and 
effective voice, and these will be incorporated into a forthcoming Fair Work Framework for Scotland. 
In moving this work forward and making the changes to the Scottish labour market that this would 
require, the Scottish Government has committed the Convention to working closely with unions, 
employers, public sector bodies and Government. 
Running alongside this policy, indeed you might say chiming with it, is the Scottish Business Pledge 
which was introduced in May 201544.  The Pledge, part of the Scotland’s Economic Strategy, is a 
voluntary code of business practice which includes a number of elements such as the Living Wage, 
no zero hours contracts, investment in youth, innovation and a number of other practices which are 
designed to produce fair work and boost ‘productivity, competitiveness, sustainable employment, 
workforce engagement and development’45. Employers are asked to pay all employees over 18 
(excluding Modern Apprentices) the Living Wage as a minimum; to show that they are already 
delivering two other elements of the Pledge and to commit to moving towards the rest within some 
unspecified timeframe. Underpinning this initiative is the idea that ‘prosperity, innovation, fairness 
and opportunity’ are mutually reinforcing. 
                                                          
42 http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Fair-Work-Convention-created-115d.aspx downloaded 15/2/16 
43 http://www.fairworkconvention.scot/index.html downloaded 15/2/16 
44 http://scottishgovernment.presscentre.com/News/Scottish-Business-Pledge-191f.aspx downloaded 15/2/16 
45 https://scottishbusinesspledge.scot/# downloaded 15/2/16 
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Such is the weight that the Scottish Government gives to the notion of fair work that they have 
designated it a Cabinet responsibility with Roseanna Cunningham, the Cabinet Secretary for Fair 
Work, Skills and Training currently taking the political lead. A Scottish Government Directorate for 
Fair Work, Skills and Training has also been established. 
The Final Tender46 document for the CHFS contains reference to HR policies which are based on 
these principles.  It states 
We expect those who deliver public contracts to adopt fair employment practices for all 
workers engaged on delivering the contract. This includes not only workers they directly 
employ but workers who they will engage with through, for example, employment agencies 
and/or “umbrella” companies 
 
and requires bidders to  
 
provide an initial Human Resources Strategy to describe how they propose to commit to 
being a best practice employer in the delivery of this contract.  
 
As part of the remit of this exercise, we have looked at the practices of both CalMac and of Serco 
Northlink, on the basis that Serco’s operations in the North Sea will be a good indicator of the values 
of the, yet untried, Serco Caledonian Ferries Ltd. 
 
Wages, pensions and security 
In terms of its employment practices, CalMac and its predecessor companies have a long-standing 
record of above average wages, a generous pension scheme and excellent training and career 
progression opportunities47.  CalMac employees have an average length of service of fourteen years, 
reflecting the attractiveness of CalMac as an employer.   
CalMac is an accredited Living Wage employer48 (having already met the criteria before accreditation 
became possible) and its parent company DML signed up to the Business Pledge49.  Announcing the 
decision, CE Martin Dorchester outlined the nature of the DML pledge: 
"Unequivocal commitment to no zero hour contracts, the living wage, industry leading 
investment in skills and training, including more modern apprenticeships, and building closer 
relationships with communities we serve are what sets David MacBrayne apart from other 
transport operators," (ibid) 
 
                                                          
46 Final CHFS ITT, 15/02/16, pge 126, Vol 2, Instructions to Participants 
47Findlay (2005, 2010) 
48 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-34047420 
49 https://www.calmac.co.uk/press/calmac-take-scottish-business-pledge downloaded 15/2/16 
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Serco Northlink became the employer of those members of staff who were TUPE-transferred from 
the publicly-owned operator Northlink when it lost the Northern Isles contract in 2012.  The terms 
and conditions of such workers remain the same in those circumstances.  However, there appears to 
have been a deterioration in aspects of the terms and conditions since that time50. Very early in the 
contract, Serco introduced changes to working practices and announced 36 redundancies.  The 
reduction in staffing did not involve compulsory redundancies but nevertheless the knock-on effect 
of this has remained to this day. The biggest changes are in what is known as the hotel department, 
where employees are having to take on additional tasks that were previously either done by other 
staff or for which they were paid overtime.  The Managing Director of Serco Northlink, Stuart 
Garrett, was quoted in the press as saying that the staffing changes would require the use of ‘more 
seasonal and temporary labour’51.   There also appears to be increasing use of agency labour (mainly 
in catering).  These workers are paid a daily rate which was described by the interviewee as the 
seafaring equivalent of a zero hours contract.   Attempts by Serco Northlink to move its employees 
to its own, less generous, pension scheme were successfully resisted by union action in 2012.  
 
 One interviewee talked of the inexperience of many of the staff brought on (both foreign and local) 
who were ‘hanging off the stanchions’ due to their inability to cope with the movement of the ship.   
Serco Northlink also employ a number of shore-based staff whose terms and conditions are not 
covered by a collective agreement.  This together with the replacement of secure work with 
seasonal and temporary work raises concerns over inconsistency with Scottish Government 
objectives in relation to fair work52.  This Scottish Government has a very strong record of working 
closely and cooperatively with trades unions and is on record as regarding them as partners in the 
pursuit of fairer, more innovative and productive workplaces53.    
 
All of this, to some extent,  is evidence to support the thesis, made in respect of the earlier tenders, 
that the only area in which a private sector operator could do better in terms of cutting costs is in 
                                                          
50 The material in this section is based on interviews with Northlink staff members.  Senior Management at 
Serco Northlink felt unable to be interviewed in the current context but they have been given the opportunity 
to correct any factual inaccuracies before publication of this report. 
51 http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/6026-northlink-dismayed-and-surprised downloaded 15/2/16 
52 Although it should be noted that the foreign seamen employed on the vessels chartered from Seatruck and 
operated under the contract by Serco Northlink do not have the same terms and conditions as either Serco 
Northlink or CalMac employees.  Some are paid below the UK Minimum Wage.  Hopefully this will be rectified 
at the next tender. 
53 Memorandum of Understanding between SG and STUC 
http://www.stuc.org.uk/files/Document%20download/Memorandum%20of%20Understanding/375794_SGan
d_STUC_Memo_WEB.pdf 
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cutting the terms and conditions of workers in an industry where labour costs are the biggest 
element of running costs.  
 
The interviewees did however have more positive things to say about Serco Northlink in relation to 
the relationship between management and workers.  Managers were said to come on board to 
observe the ‘happiness’ of the ship and there is a system of open meetings where managers take 
questions and ‘always provide an answer’.   Some changes to the way the ships are operated were 
observed to cause more work for the crew but they were accepted as being good for the customers, 
such as the practice of allowing passengers to board on a B&B basis when a ship is tied up.  
Management were seen to be particularly accommodating to freight customers but often at the 
expense of creating more work for the crew.  The impact, if any, of this last element is hard to judge 
as no figures are published regarding the number of commercial vehicles carried by Serco Northlink. 
 
Overall there appears to be a clear, albeit small, deterioration in terms and conditions of employees 
– some to a greater extent than others.  Perhaps of more concern for the current purpose are the 
comments of the Serco Caledonian bid team, who were in Skye in January discussing their plans 
should they win the bid.  The leader of the team was described in the West Highland Free Press 
article (22/1/16) as hinting that ‘too many CalMac ships were carrying crew members which weren’t 
required.’  This has raised fears that  more redundancies might follow  should Serco Caledonian win 
the bid.  We shall return to this in the next section when we discuss safety and later in the 
concluding section. 
 
Training and Safety 
CalMac, as indicated earlier, has a good record in both training and safety.  In terms of training, 
there are examples of employees coming in at ratings grade and rising to become ship’s masters.  
There are examples of staff being seconded across the business between ship and shore to bring 
their experience to different projects, such as port staff working in Head Office on technical projects 
and seafaring staff working on the current bid.    
 
CalMac has a Learning and Training Academy which has been up and running for eighteen months 
and which provides a range of learning opportunities for employees across the board.  Employees 
are encouraged to choose things they are interested in and also courses which would allow them to 
‘move on’.  CalMac’s proactive approach to training and safety were outlined in the 2005 and 2010 
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reports.  A recent example of this is in terms of the 2010 Manila Amendments54 to the Standards of 
Training Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) which is required for all seafarers.  This was to be 
phased in from that time but CalMac began putting their staff through it immediately.  Some five 
and more years later, the employees of Serco Northlink are facing a deadline to complete the 
training by the end of this year. 
 
In terms of the long-run sustainability of the industry and the provision of skilled labour, CalMac 
makes an effective contribution in terms of taking on six to ten cadets each year.  Most of those 
apprentices will move on to other companies and indeed will necessarily do so for at least a period 
in order to do the 3-6 month deep sea training that is required as part of their Officer of the Watch 
certificate. 
 
The following information was given by the Minister in reply to a written question by David Stewart 
MSP on 29th October 2015.55 
Since January 2006, including the most recent intake from August / September this year, 
CalMac Ferries Ltd have sponsored a total of 118 Deck, Engine and Electro Technical Officer 
Cadets, details of which are outlined in the following table:- 
  
  Current Previous 
Deck Officer Cadets 23 42 
Engineer Officer Cadets 24 24 
Electro Technical Officer Cadets 3 2 
  50 68 
  
For Officer Cadets, CalMac are in a tri-partite arrangement with Clyde Marine Training 
Limited and Northern Marine Management Limited. For the duration of their cadetship, 
Officer Cadets are employed by Clyde Marine Training Limited and sponsored by CalMac 
Ferries Ltd. The majority of the Officer Cadets’ sea phases are spent on deep sea voyages 
with Northern Marine Management Limited, in-filled with some time at sea with CalMac 
ferries Ltd. 
  
Of the 68 previous Officer Cadets, 17 failed to complete their training. Of the remaining 51 
Officer Cadets, 6 have been given permanent employment with CalMac Ferries Ltd. In 
addition, 1 Officer Cadet who did not complete his cadetship has been given permanent 
employment by CalMac Ferries Ltd, as a rating rather than an officer. Of the remaining 44 
Officer Cadets, CalMac do not hold records of their current employment status. 
  
 
 
                                                          
54 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/manila-amendments-and-how-they-affect-seafarer-training-and-certificates 
downloaded 15/2/16 
55 Written Question from David Stewart MSP  (S4W-27942) 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20151029.pdf  
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Since January 2006, CalMac Ferries Ltd have recruited a total of 26 Deck and Engine Rating 
Trainees, details of which are outlined in the following table:- 
  
    
2006 
  
  
2010 
  
  
2013 
  
  
2014 
  
  
Deck Ratings Trainees 
  
   
4 
  
   
2 
  
   
6 
  
   
6 
  
   
Engine Rating Trainees 
  
   
0 
  
   
0 
  
   
4 
  
   
4 
  
   
Permanently Employed 
  
   
3 
  
   
2 
  
   
8 
  
   
0 
  
   
Still Completing Training 
  
   
0 
  
   
0 
  
   
1 
  
   
9 
  
 
  
  
Of the 26 trainees recruited, 13 have been given permanent employment, 10 are still 
completing their training and 3 have left the Company. Of the 3 who moved on, 2 left after 
being given permanent employment elsewhere and 1 during the course of their training. 
  
 This contribution to training the next generation of seafarers for the whole industry is not matched 
by the private sector.  Serco Northlink, do, of course, put all their employees through the necessary 
training procedures and all have the minimum level of qualifications to be at sea.  They also, of 
course, comply with the Tonnage Tax Scheme56 which requires that  
‘the company or group must enter into a “Training Commitment” with the Department for 
Transport. Broadly, this requires: 
 The training of one trainee per year for each 15 officers, or 
 Payment in lieu to the Maritime Training Trust. 
 The trainees must be British or EEA nationals and ordinarily resident in the UK.’ 
Serco Northlink have trained twelve officer cadets under this scheme which is the minimum required 
over that period to qualify for the Tonnage Tax scheme57. 
                                                          
56 hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ttmmanual/ttm01010.htm   
57 The Tonnage Tax regulations have recently been amended to allow UK ratings to be included in the 
mandatory proportion of UK officers that qualifying companies must train. This adjustment to the scheme 
allows companies to train 3 UK ratings for every 1 UK officer. However, this is only a three year pilot scheme to 
2018 and will expire if there is no take up by the shipping industry which, to date, has been slow. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1607/pdfs/uksiem_20151607_en.pdf  
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Currently at Northlink, there is said to be a gap in the age profile of qualified engineers/ABSs with no 
training provision to ensure continuity when the current group in their 40s and 50s retire. This 
problem is said to be more acute in terms of motormen, three of whom have retired in the last year.  
The company have hired 4th engineers because there are no qualified motormen coming through.  
This is a UK wide problem with the number of UK engine ratings down last year by 13%58 but it is a 
problem to which Serco Northlink do not appear to be part of the solution. 
 
One interviewee suggested that use by Serco of a private security company on board ships means 
that cabin space is used up which therefore cannot be used by trainees.  This lack of urgency about 
the long term training needs is typical of both the short-time horizon of the private sector (no longer 
than the term of the contract) and the unwillingness to do anything beyond what is strictly required 
in the contract.  As outlined here, the public sector operator has a different set of values which 
embody the continuing nature of the state of which it sees itself as part. 
 
There is no suggestion that Serco Northlink is operating unsafe ships and, indeed, one Northlink 
interviewee described there being a ‘good safety consciousness’ on board ship and found 
management to be responsive when requests for equipment to make the workplace safer were 
made.  However, the issue of safety, which has been raised in the earlier reports is crucial in this 
context.  Hotel and catering staff play a role in emergency situations and cutting their staffing levels 
to what is strictly necessary for their normal functions, or requiring them to play dual roles at times, 
could, in an emergency, impact on the safety of the ship and its passengers.  
 
The Scottish Government is currently consulting on a Future Islands Bill59 which seeks to provide a 
‘more prosperous and fairer future’ for the islands.  In that context, ferry policy is crucial.  The Fraser 
of Allander Institute report referred to earlier outlined the way in which the operation of CalMac on 
the Clyde and Hebrides routes contributes hugely to the economy and culture of the islands.  Part of 
their calculation does of course relate to the operation of the ferry services and these benefits would 
accrue regardless of who the operator is.  However, there is undoubtedly an additional benefit to 
the island communities in there being good quality, well-paid jobs with the opportunity of career 
progression and stability of employment.  The report outlines that the average wage at CalMac is 
12% higher than the average wage in Scotland, and that the 1476 CalMac jobs support 5883 other 
jobs in Scotland.  Many of these jobs are on the islands themselves (the report gives a detailed 
                                                          
58 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/sfr01-seafarers-active-at-sea  
59 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/09/5388 
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breakdown by community) and the numbers supported would be much lower if average wages or 
employment fell for any reason.  The report confirms the average length of service of CalMac staff as 
just short of 14 years and calculates that CalMac staff have a total of 20,000 years of experience. The 
knock-on effect on what the report describes as ‘fragile’ island economies of any degradation of the 
quality of jobs would be extremely serious and the impact specifically on young people entering the 
labour market would be particularly harsh.   
 
The report also gives updated information on the ways in which CalMac contributes to the cultural 
life of the islands.  This non-core aspect of CalMac’s activities has been commented on before 
(Findlay, 2005) and should not be dismissed lightly.  The report’s author estimates that the Royal 
National Mod with which CalMac has a long association has itself created jobs in the areas in which 
it is held. The direct sponsorship of musical and other cultural events itself brings tourism to the 
islands.  These are elements of what is currently provided to island communities which would be at 
risk in the context of a profit-maximising private sector operator.   
In summary, there is ample evidence that the public sector operator CalMac has employment policies 
and values which are fully in line with Scottish Government thinking in these matters and with the 
direction in which the Government wishes the Scottish labour market to change and which contribute 
to its planned Future Islands policy.  It does therefore, have the potential to be a leader in the sector 
and for the economy as a whole in delivering fair work, good quality work, training and innovation as 
well as a good quality service to the consumer/public.  Indeed, to a considerable degree, it already is 
leading in these areas.  There is much less evidence that Serco Caledonian could or would wish to 
play that role and its motivation and focus in winning the CHFS tender is naturally based on its status 
as a profit-seeking entity. That is not to say that private sector firms cannot and do not have the 
potential to be fair, innovative and progressive employers but the time-limiting nature of a contract 
such as this tends to mitigate against the pursuit of such goals.  Moreover the experience of Serco 
Northlink as described above, and the activities of Serco in other markets, suggests that the overall 
labour market strategy of the Serco group of companies is not pointing in the same direction as that 
of the Scottish Government in a number of key respects. 
 
 
5 Costs and risks of tender 
Costs 
 27 
 
Many of the costs associated with tendering are not publicly known until after the process is 
complete.  Some of the costs attached to the previous CHFS contract in 2006 were revealed in 
200760.  The one-off tax bill consequent on the separation of CalMac and CMAL turned out to be 
£11m which was just outside the estimated range given in Findlay (2005) of £5-10m.  The additional 
cost of £4.3m presumably related to both civil service time and consultancy fees although no finer 
breakdown is given. 
In March 2015 in Written Answers61 62to David Stewart MSP the estimated tendering costs to the 
Scottish Government between October 2014 and November 2016 were given as between £900,000 
and £1m.  Figures were also given by the Transport Minister for consultancy fees for CalMac, CMAL 
and DML.  Not all of these figures will relate to the tender process, indeed the figures for CMAL will 
include engineering consultancies.  However, the figures for CalMac for the period 2014-15 (up to 
the end of February 2015) of £3.9m and the corresponding figure for DML of £1.36m (£2.8m and 
£1m respectively for 2013-14) are striking.  Especially in light of the significant increase from the 
equivalent figures for 2012-13 (£157,000 and 285,000 respectively) and the unknown expenditure in 
the remaining twenty-two months to November 2016.  Leaving aside any consultancy fees relating 
to the online ticketing upgrade and the introduction of on-board Wi-Fi, these are most likely to be 
related to the current bid.  One can only assume that the other bidder, Serco Caledonian has 
incurred similar if not higher costs.  The total costs associated with tendering therefore remain 
extremely high and are particularly hard to justify in the light of almost no potential for cost savings.   
 
Risk 
The Scottish Ferries Plan reiterates the long-held view of the Scottish Government that tendering is 
necessary in order to comply with European competition regulations.  This is a view which has been 
disputed in some quarters such as Kay (2009, 2010)63 and is discussed in detail in Findlay (2005, 
2010).  The view of the Scottish Government expressed in the Ferries Plan is that 
  ‘EU rules require tendering of all subsidised ferry services’  
                                                          
60 http://www.scotsman.com/news/bill-for-calmac-tender-is-163-15m-1-685024  
61 Written Answer to David Stewart MSP S4W-24956  
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/BusinessBulletin/87910.aspx 
 
62 Written Answer to David Stewart MSP S4W-24957 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20150327.pdf  
63 Kay, Neil (2010) Scottish ferry policy and the Commission Decision, Quarterly  Economic Commentary, Vol 
33, pp 61-66 
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but,  somewhat contradictorily, it also states that it  
‘would prefer the decision on whether or not to tender to be taken by the accountable public 
authority’. 
Whether or not it is, strictly necessary in law, the notion that competitive tendering is the best 
means to achieve economic efficiency carries some weight among regulators and academics.  In 
circumstances such as those outlined here, however, the perverse result may arise that the 
tendering of services actually reduce competition and thereby produce long-run inefficiency.  This 
arises because if at any point CalMac loses the CHFS contract then they would cease to exist and the 
private sector operator, Serco, would face no competition at all.  The point is put very clearly by Kay 
(2010)64 when he says: 
CalMac will have to defend its right to run the network every six years and if it loses just once 
in the tendering process this will effectively eliminate it once and for all as an operator - or at 
least as an operator with the resources and capabilities necessary to run such a network.     
This remains the position today despite attempts at diversification out of Scotland by David 
MacBrayne, and is a striking example of an unintended perverse and negative consequence of 
competitive tendering.   
 
 
 
6 Conclusion  
The remit of this report was to set out the context and background of the current tender for the 
Clyde and Hebrides Ferry Service and to comment on aspects of the two bidders’, their capacity and 
experience to handle a service of such size and complexity and to consider how, in doing so, they 
might contribute to other important strands of Scottish Government policy and Scotland’s Economic 
Strategy.    
 
The evidence, such as is available, leads to the conclusion that there are distinct differences in the 
likely outcome under the two possibilities before us.   
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These differences do not lie, necessarily, in the performance of the contract as specified in the final 
tender document, although it is clear that CalMac is by far the more experienced of the two and that 
there is considerably more doubt in relation to the Serco Caledonian bid. This is based on the 
relatively limited experience of the Serco Group in running ferry services in Scotland and with such 
experience as they have being in the much smaller and less fragmented Northern Isles. The ethos, 
history and financial position of its parent company is also a consideration which should not be 
ignored. 
 
In the period of the contract it is also likely, in addition to meeting the precise terms of the contract 
in all respects, that the public sector option, CalMac would provide a performance, direction and 
ethos which is more in tune not only with the Scottish Government’s Ferries Plan but also with their 
Fair Work agenda which is integral to the delivery of inclusive growth as outlined in the current 
Programme for Government.  Its contribution to the maritime skills base is also crucial and would 
not, on all the evidence before us, be replaced by equal provision from the private sector.   
 
While it would undoubtedly be an unintended consequence of the tendering process, an outcome 
which saw the end of CalMac on the CHFS routes would be the loss to Scotland and the Scottish 
economy of an  important champion of fair work practices at a time when the Scottish Government 
is urging collaboration across the  business community, union and other labour market stakeholders 
to deliver fair work as a driver of inclusive growth.  
 
A further consequence, also unintended, might be a direction of change within the service, which 
turns away from the ‘fairer and more prosperous future’ which the Government claims it desires for 
fragile island communities. 
 
Moving beyond the next tender period, and reiterating previous warnings, the outcome of this 
tender process could irreversibly change the circumstances that Government would face and 
irrevocably constrain the options available to them.  Should CalMac lose the CHFS there is very 
limited likelihood that there would be any competition on this route at all.  Perversely, the 
deployment of competitive tendering could, in this instance, destroy competition completely and 
the Scottish Government, and the island communities which it seeks to protect and develop, would 
be left at the mercy of a private sector monopolist.  Such a monopolist would have a significantly 
strengthened hand in setting the terms of any new contract.  This dilemma is not new or, indeed, 
unforeseeable.  Indeed, in a different context, Audit Scotland described this very problem when 
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reviewing the actions of the then Scottish Executive in relation to the Northern Isles contract in 
200465 when it was forced to make additional payments to keep the ferries running.    In the scenario 
outlined above, a future Scottish Government would have no choice at that point other than to do 
what the Scottish Executive did in 2004 – to pay whatever was demanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/docs/central/2005/nr_051222_northlink_ferry.pdf downloaded 15/2/16 
